Thursday, January 10, 2008

Tata Nano: The World’s Cheapest Car

From: http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/tata-nano-the-worlds-cheapest-car/

Tata NanoRatan Tata, chairman of Tata Motors, displaying the Nano in New Delhi on Thursday. (Photo by Money Sharma/European Pressphoto Association)

Tata Motors today took the covers off the world's cheapest car — the Nano.

Over the past year, Tata has been building hype for a car that would cost a mere 100,000 rupees (roughly $2,500) and bring automotive transportation to the mainstream Indian population. It has been nicknamed the "People's Car." Over the course of the New Delhi Auto Expo, which began this week, anticipation had grown to fever pitch.

With the theme from "2001: A Space Odyssey" playing, Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata Motors drove the small white bubble car onto Tata's show stage, where it joined two others.

Tata NanoThe Tata Nano could sell for around $2,500. (Photo by Raveendran/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images)

"They are not concept cars, they are not prototypes," Mr. Tata announced when he got out of the car. "They are the production cars that will roll out of the Singur plant later this year."

The four-door Nano is a little over 10 feet long and nearly 5 feet wide. It is powered by a 623cc two-cylinder engine at the back of the car. With 33 horsepower, the Nano is capable of 65 miles an hour. Its four small wheels are at the absolute corners of the car to improve handling. There is a small trunk, big enough for a duffel bag.

"Today, we indeed have a People's Car, which is affordable and yet built to meet safety requirements and emission norms, to be fuel efficient and low on emissions," Mr. Tata added. "We are happy to present the People's Car to India and we hope it brings the joy, pride and utility of owning a car to many families who need personal mobility."

The base price for the Nano will be 120,000 rupees, including road tax and delivery. Higher level models will cost more and come with air-conditioning. Sun visors and radios are extra.

The nearest priced competitor is the Maruti 800, which costs roughly twice as much as the Nano. In comparing the Nano to the Maruti 800, Mr. Tata said, "It is 8 percent smaller — bumper to bumper — and has 21 percent larger seating capacity than Maruti 800."

The Hindustan Times reports reactions from a couple of Tata's competitors, Maruti and Hyundai:

Jagdish Khattar, a former head of Maruti 800 manufacturer Maruti Udyog Ltd., says it's too early to say whether the Nano will overtake the original.

"It's a good product but it's still too early to say whether it will overtake the 800 because it caters to a totally new market segment," he said while watching a live telecast of Tata's press conference after unveiling of the Nano.

But clearly, at least one other manufacturer was worried.

An official of Hyundai Motors, which unveiled an LPG version of its Santro Thursday, was more circumspect.

"We definitely see it as impacting our sales," he said in halting English, preferring to maintain anonymity.

Anand Mahindra, managing director for Mahindra & Mahindra, Tata Motors' primary competitor, said before the unveiling, "I think it's a moment of history and I'm delighted an Indian company is leading the way."

The Nano will go on sale in India later this year with an initial production run of 250,000 a year. Tata says it will offer the Nano in other emerging markets in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa within four years.

 

--
Regards,
Karthik Iyer

Sunday, January 06, 2008

New York times opinion of Islam

From: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/books/review/Ali-t.html?ex=1357189200&en=ab28947541f17db5&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink



January 6, 2008

Blind Faiths

Skip to next paragraph

THE SUICIDE OF REASON

Radical Islam's Threat to the Enlightenment.

By Lee Harris.

290 pp. Basic Books. $26.

Several authors have published books on radical Islam's threat to the West since that shocking morning in September six years ago. With "The Suicide of Reason," Lee Harris joins their ranks. But he distinguishes himself by going further than most of his counterparts: he considers the very worst possibility — the destruction of the West by radical Islam. There is a sense of urgency in his writing, a desire to shake awake the leaders of the West, to confront them with their failure to understand that they are engaged in a war with an adversary who fights by the law of the jungle.

Harris, the author of "Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History," devotes most of his book to identifying and distinguishing between two kinds of fanaticism. The first is Islamic fanaticism, a formidable enemy in the struggle for cultural survival. In Harris's view, this fanaticism has acted as a "defense mechanism," shielding Islam from the pressures of the changing world around it and allowing it to expand into territories and cultures where it had previously been unknown.

With few exceptions, Harris sees Islamic expansion as permanent. Although this point is arguable, he bravely attempts to make the case that the entry of Islam into another culture produces changes on every level, from political to personal: "Wherever Islam has spread, there has occurred a total and revolutionary transformation in the culture of those conquered or converted."

In describing the imperialist nature of Islam, Harris suggests that it is distinct from the Roman, British and French empires. He views Islamic imperialism as a single-minded expansion of the religion itself; the empire that it envisions is governed by Allah. In this sense, the idea of jihad is less about the inner struggle for peace and justice and more about a grand mission of conversion. It should be said, however, that Harris's argument is incomplete, since he does not address the spread of Christianity in the Roman, British and French empires.

The expansion of Islam is perhaps more potent than the expansion of the Christian empires (including Rome after Constantine) because the concept of separating the sacred from the profane has never been acceptable in Islam the way it has been in Christianity. The Romans, the British and the French went about annexing large parts of the world more for earthly or material gain than for spiritual dominance. Under these empires, the clergy was allowed to propagate its faith as long as it did not jeopardize imperial interests.

Harris goes on to argue that the Muslim world, since it is governed by the law of the jungle, makes group survival paramount. This explains in part the willingness of Muslims to become martyrs for the larger community, the umma — uniting peoples separated by geographical boundaries, with different cultures, heritages and languages. According to Harris, this sense of solidarity is sustainable only with the weapon of fanaticism, which obligates each member of the umma to convert infidels and to threaten those who attempt to leave with death. That is, the aim of Muslim culture, so different from that of the West, is both to preserve and to convert, and this is what enables it to spread across the globe.

The second fanaticism that Harris identifies is one he views as infecting Western societies; he calls it a "fanaticism of reason." Reason, he says, contains within itself a potential fatality because it blinds Western leaders to the true nature of Islamic-influenced cultures. Westerners see these cultures merely as different versions of the world they know, with dominant values similar to those espoused in their own culture. But this, Harris argues, is a fatal mistake. It implies that the West fails to appreciate both its history and the true nature of its opposition.

Nor, he points out, is the failure linked to a particular political outlook. Liberals and conservatives alike share this misperception. Noam Chomsky and Paul Wolfowitz agreed, Harris writes, "that you couldn't really blame the terrorists, since they were merely the victims of an evil system — for Chomsky, American imperialism, for Wolfowitz, the corrupt and despotic regimes of the Middle East." That is to say, while left and right may disagree on the causes and the remedies, they both overlook the fanaticism inherent in Islam itself. Driven by their blind faith in reason, they interpret the problem in a way that is familiar to them, in order to find a solution that fits within their doctrine of reason. The same is true for such prominent intellectuals as Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.

Harris does not regard Islamic fanaticism as a deviancy or a madness that affects a few Muslims and terrifies many. Instead he argues that fanaticism is the basic principle in Islam. "The Muslims are, from an early age, indoctrinated into a shaming code that demands a fanatical rejection of anything that threatens to subvert the supremacy of Islam," he writes. During the years that this shaming code is instilled into children, the collective is emphasized above the individual and his freedoms. A good Muslim must forsake all: his property, family, children, even life for the sake of Islam. Boys in particular are taught to be dominating and merciless, which has the effect of creating a society of holy warriors.

By contrast, the West has cultivated an ethos of individualism, reason and tolerance, and an elaborate system in which every actor, from the individual to the nation-state, seeks to resolve conflict through words. The entire system is built on the idea of self-interest. This ethos rejects fanaticism. The alpha male is pacified and groomed to study hard, find a good job and plan prudently for retirement: "While we in America are drugging our alpha boys with Ritalin," Harris writes, "the Muslims are doing everything in their power to encourage their alpha boys to be tough, aggressive and ruthless."

The West has variously tried to convert, to assimilate and to seduce Muslims into modernity, but, Harris says, none of these approaches have succeeded. Meanwhile, our worship of reason is making us easy prey for a ruthless, unscrupulous and extremely aggressive predator and may be contributing to a slow cultural "suicide."

Harris's book is so engaging that it is difficult to put down, and its haunting assessments make it difficult for a reader to sleep at night. He deserves praise for raising serious questions. But his arguments are not entirely sound.

I disagree, for instance, that the way to rescue Western civilization from a path of suicide is to challenge its tradition of reason. Indeed, for all his understanding of the rise of fanaticism in general and its Islamic manifestation in particular, Harris's use of the term "reason" is faulty.

Enlightenment thinkers, preoccupied with both individual freedom and secular and limited government, argued that human reason is fallible. They understood that reason is more than just rational thought; it is also a process of trial and error, the ability to learn from past mistakes. The Enlightenment cannot be fully appreciated without a strong awareness of just how frail human reason is. That is why concepts like doubt and reflection are central to any form of decision-making based on reason.

Harris is pessimistic in a way that the Enlightenment thinkers were not. He takes a Darwinian view of the struggle between clashing cultures, criticizing the West for an ethos of selfishness, and he follows Hegel in asserting that where the interest of the individual collides with that of the state, it is the state that should prevail. This is why he attributes such strength to Islamic fanaticism. The collectivity of the umma elevates the communal interest above that of the individual believer. Each Muslim is a slave, first of God, then of the caliphate. Although Harris does not condone this extreme subversion of the self, still a note of admiration seems to creep into his descriptions of Islam's fierce solidarity, its adherence to tradition and the willingness of individual Muslims to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the greater good.

In addition, Harris extols American exceptionalism together with Hegel as if there were no contradiction between the two. But what makes America unique, especially in contrast to Europe, is its resistance to the philosophy of Hegel with its concept of a unifying world spirit. It is the individual that matters most in the United States. And more generally, it is individuals who make cultures and who break them. Social and cultural evolution has always relied on individuals — to reform, persuade, cajole or force. Culture is formed by the collective agreement of individuals. At the same time, it is crucial that we not fall into the trap of assuming that the survival tactics of individuals living in tribal societies — like lying, hypocrisy, secrecy, violence, intimidation, and so forth — are in the interest of the modern individual or his culture.

I was not born in the West. I was raised with the code of Islam, and from birth I was indoctrinated into a tribal mind-set. Yet I have changed, I have adopted the values of the Enlightenment, and as a result I have to live with the rejection of my native clan as well as the Islamic tribe. Why have I done so? Because in a tribal society, life is cruel and terrible. And I am not alone. Muslims have been migrating to the West in droves for decades now. They are in search of a better life. Yet their tribal and cultural constraints have traveled with them. And the multiculturalism and moral relativism that reign in the West have accommodated this.

Harris is correct, I believe, that many Western leaders are terribly confused about the Islamic world. They are woefully uninformed and often unwilling to confront the tribal nature of Islam. The problem, however, is not too much reason but too little. Harris also fails to address the enemies of reason within the West: religion and the Romantic movement. It is out of rejection of religion that the Enlightenment emerged; Romanticism was a revolt against reason.

Both the Romantic movement and organized religion have contributed a great deal to the arts and to the spirituality of the Western mind, but they share a hostility to modernity. Moral and cultural relativism (and their popular manifestation, multiculturalism) are the hallmarks of the Romantics. To argue that reason is the mother of the current mess the West is in is to miss the major impact this movement has had, first in the West and perhaps even more profoundly outside the West, particularly in Muslim lands.

Thus, it is not reason that accommodates and encourages the persistent segregation and tribalism of immigrant Muslim populations in the West. It is Romanticism. Multiculturalism and moral relativism promote an idealization of tribal life and have shown themselves to be impervious to empirical criticism. My reasons for reproaching today's Western leaders are different from Harris's. I see them squandering a great and vital opportunity to compete with the agents of radical Islam for the minds of Muslims, especially those within their borders. But to do so, they must allow reason to prevail over sentiment.

To argue, as Harris seems to do, that children born and bred in superstitious cultures that value fanaticism and create phalanxes of alpha males are doomed — and will doom others — to an existence governed by the law of the jungle is to ignore the lessons of the West's own past. There have been periods when the West was less than noble, when it engaged in crusades, inquisitions, witch-burnings and genocides. Many of the Westerners who were born into the law of the jungle, with its alpha males and submissive females, have since become acquainted with the culture of reason and have adopted it. They are even — and this should surely relieve Harris of some of his pessimism — willing to die for it, perhaps with the same fanaticism as the jihadists willing to die for their tribe. In short, while this conflict is undeniably a deadly struggle between cultures, it is individuals who will determine the outcome.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, is the author of "Infidel."



--
Regards,
Karthik Iyer

Saturday, August 25, 2007

The Simpsons - India Outsourcing

watch and laugh
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9_iQim8Mtw

--
Regards,
Karthik Iyer

Friday, August 24, 2007

Why a green card does not mean permanent residency

Print Article - US: 750,000 immigrants asked to replace green card






US: 750,000 immigrants asked to replace green cards

PTI | August 23, 2007 | 22:06 IST

Seema Hakhu Kachru in Houston

Nearly one million legal residents in the United States whose green cards do not have expiration dates may soon have to pay $370 to replace them, or face imprisonment.

Green cards are proof of authorisation to live and work in the US.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services on Wednesday announced a proposal that requires nearly 750,000 legal permanent residents who were issued green cards between 1977 and 1989 that lack expiration dates to replace their cards.

The plan does not require Congressional approval.

The proposed change, once finalised, gives applicants 120 days to update their cards.

Those who willfully neglect to comply could face up to 30 days in jail or fine up to $100, or both.

"The change will allow the US Citizenship and Immigration Services to issue more secure permanent resident cards, update cardholder information, conduct background checks and electronically store applicants' fingerprint and photographic information," according to the agency's statement.

Although the change would not invalidate the legal status of cardholders, the proposal notes that failure to obtain replacement cards could cause problems when traveling or looking for work.

The proposal states that affected permanent residents must apply between October 22 and February 19.

Previously, immigration authorities had encouraged permanent residents with old-style green cards issued before 1989 to renew them -- but replacement was not mandatory. All green cards issued after 1989 expire every 10 years.

The announcement is the latest in a series of measures outlined by the Department of Homeland Security to tighten immigration controls within existing laws and regulations.

Two weeks ago, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff announced plans for tougher enforcement, including fines and stiffer requirements for employers who knowingly hire or retain undocumented foreign workers.

The new proposal requires applicants to provide current biographic and biometric (photographs and fingerprint) information.

The rule also proposes a mechanism for terminating green cards without an expiration date. Under the rule, USCIS would be able to terminate permanent resident cards without an expiration date via notice in the Federal Register.



Monday, August 20, 2007

sri sri ravishankar vs Zakir naik

Sri sri and Zakir Naik on one platform. It looks like sri sri shines thro!
Just do a keyword search in youtube:
"Islam & Hinduism" for other videos in the series

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOipXyNN9UQ

--
Regards,
Karthik Iyer

Friday, August 17, 2007

The R&AW Facts

A good article on the defeats and victories of India's external intelligence agency: R&AW
From: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IH18Df03.html

Page 1 of 2
BOOK REVIEW
India's silent warriors
The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane by B Raman

Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia

Secrecy and intelligence agencies are synonymous. Very rarely does the general public get a peek into the shadowy world of spooks and their death-defying deeds shrouded behind the iron curtain of state secrets.

In a new offering from India's premier publishing house on



strategic affairs, B Raman, the former head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), pries open the black box with hard-hitting scrutiny. The Kaoboys of R&AW is at once a nostalgic tribute to India's silent warriors and an inquisition into what is wrong with their legendary organization.

Raman's opening salvo is fired at the US State Department, which was much hated in R&AW during his 26-year tenure. One State Department official may have passed on to Pakistan Indian intelligence reports on Khalistani terrorists that New Delhi had shared with Washington. In 1992, the State Department threatened to impose economic sanctions on India after it refused permission for US sleuths to go on an aerial-photography mission along the Sino-Indian border. In 1994, it warned New Delhi that if R&AW did not halt covert missions in Pakistan, the United States would "act against India" (p 5).

Moving back to 1971, Raman chronicles the decision of India's then-prime minister Indira Gandhi to deploy the two-and-half-year-old R&AW into action as the East Pakistan crisis deepened. R&AW trained Bengali guerrillas and organized a psychological-warfare campaign against Pakistani rulers. Almost every day, Indira had at her disposal bugged extracts from telephonic conversations of the Pakistani top brass on the evolving situation. She did not make a single decision on the Bangladesh issue without consulting the R&AW chief, R N Kao.

Between 1969 and 1971, clandestine units of R&AW disrupted Chinese-backed Naga and Mizo insurgent traffic, sanctuaries and infrastructure in Myanmar and East Pakistan. The Richard Nixon administration in Washington initiated a joint program with Islamabad to hit back at India by encouraging a separatist movement among the Sikhs of Punjab. The US National Security Council, led by Henry Kissinger, sponsored allegations in the press and public forums of violations of Sikhs' human rights. US interest in the Khalistan insurgency remained firm up to 1984.

Intriguingly, R&AW and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) simultaneously colluded to prevent a possible Chinese takeover of northern Burma. George H W Bush, the director of the CIA from 1975-77, became a personal friend of Kao. Later, when Bush was US vice president, Kao succeeded in persuading him to turn off the aid tap to Khalistani terrorists. Raman comments here that "benevolence and malevolence go side by side in relations between intelligence agencies" (p 42).

In the mid-1970s, Kao sensed the urgency of enabling R&AW to collect intelligence about US movements in the Indian Ocean region. He cobbled together a liaison relationship with the French and Iranian intelligence agencies to monitor the Americans, an oddity given that the shah of Iran was among the closest allies of the United States. To Raman, R&AW's present capacity to stalk the US remains weak. He chides the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for "not seeming to be unduly concerned about it" (p 48).

Shortly after R&AW's creation in 1968, Kao arranged a secret liaison relationship with Israel's Mossad to "learn from its counter-terrorism techniques" (p 127). In the early 1980s, Pakistan was genuinely worried about the chances of a joint Indo-Israeli operation to destroy its uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta. For 12 years, Mossad officers were posted in New Delhi under the cover of South American businessmen.

An interesting development Raman mentions is secret meetings in the late 1980s between the chiefs of R&AW and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) that were facilitated by Prince Talal of Jordan. The ISI denied harboring Khalistani terrorists but, outside media glare, it did hand over to R&AW some Sikh deserters of the Indian Army.

Raman favors exchanges of this sort over inane joint counter-terrorism mechanisms, so that the top spooks of both countries meet each other periodically without a formal agenda and "compare notes on developments of common interest" (p 234).

Raman partially blames the lack of objectivity of R&AW's branch dealing with Bangladesh for the decline in its performance in India's eastern frontier after 1975. Witchhunts by politicians, nepotism, discriminatory internal security checks, minimal interaction between senior and junior officers, permissiveness and trade unionism have added to R&AW's woes over the years. Persisting frictions over recruitment and inter-service seniority "come in the way of R&AW officers developing an esprit de corps even 39 years after formation of the organization" (p 133).

K Santanam of R&AW's science and technology division was the first to assess that Pakistan was covertly constructing a uranium-enrichment plant. He systematically monitored developments relating to Pakistan's nuclear program, including the procurement racket of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Raman reveals that, in an unguarded moment, Indian prime minister Morarji Desai indiscreetly told Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq that he was aware of Islamabad's nuclear schemes.

R&AW trained the intelligence officers of many independent African countries and assisted the anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa and Namibia. Retired R&AW officers were deputed to work in training institutes of intelligence agencies of some African states. Raman terms it a pity that R&AW frittered away its 

Continued 1 2 

Page 2 of 2
BOOK REVIEW
India's silent warriors
The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane
by
B Raman

Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia

goodwill in Africa through subsequent negligence, ceding ground to China. In 1971, R&AW counterinsurgency specialists also empowered the Sri Lankan government to crush the uprising of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.

In the context of some R&AW reports on Khalistani terrorists



proving wrong, Raman avers that "lack of coordination in trans-border operations, often resulting in inaccurate, misleading and alarming reporting, continues to be the bane of our intelligence community" (p 97). Kao was crestfallen at the negligence and lax supervision of senior staffers of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) that allowed Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984.

Likewise, Raman's cautions about a threat to the life of Rajiv Gandhi from Sri Lankan Tamil extremists "were treated with skepticism" by the intelligence community with fatal consequences. "Everybody in Delhi" was convinced that they "would never harm Rajiv because he and his mother had helped them more than any other Indian leader" (p 236).

Raman bluntly notes that Indian security agencies "rarely admit their deficiencies. That is why we keep moving from one tragedy to another" (p 244). The IB's jealousies, reservations and prejudices against R&AW leave much to be desired and fragment India's intelligence faculties. Two parallel setups in the IB and R&AW are a duplicating luxury that the Indian taxpayer is burdened with.

Raman devotes many words to weaknesses in R&AW's counterintelligence capability that came to the fore in the 1980s. The French intelligence agency penetrated the Indian Prime Minister's Office, and the CIA was found to be collecting documents in R&AW's Chennai office. The recent defection of R&AW's Rabinder Singh to the US after years of undetected service as a CIA mole reflects the sorry state of affairs. Last year, the CIA was reported to have infiltrated India's National Security Council Secretariat. Raman envisages a day when "the sensitive establishments of this country have been badly penetrated under the guise of intelligence cooperation" (p 255).

Linguistic weaknesses of R&AW staff often come in the way of analytical and operational work in India's surroundings, thanks to a "needless fascination for west European languages" (p 130). MI5, now known as the British Security Service, had "more Punjabi-Gurumukhi-knowing experts than the IB and the R&AW put together" (p 152). Raman also finds fault with the structure of India's national-security management under the governments of Atal Bihair Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, wherein the chief of R&AW has been reduced to a subordinate of the national security adviser with little direct access to the prime minister.

Though Raman exonerates R&AW from the charge of politicization in comparison with the IB and the Central Bureau of Investigation, he admits that R&AW officials gave "ideas" to prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to cover up the controversial Bofors kickback scandal. Bofors "brought out some of the worst traits in our intelligence and investigative agencies" (p 177). Yet it was during Rajiv's reign that R&AW, particularly its Pakistan division, regained strong covert-action capacity that could "bite again".

It was in the Rajiv era that R&AW played a key behind-the-scenes role in normalization of New Delhi-Beijing relations and launched a hotline between its chief and his Chinese counterpart. The political leaders of the two countries could also use it to avoid the normal diplomatic channel. During the first Gulf War of 1991, Chinese intelligence offered oil supplies to India to overcome any shortages that might crop up. Overall, Raman considers R&AW to be inadequate in analyzing data on China.

At the end of the Cold War, R&AW harnessed its closeness to Russian intelligence to secure assurances that whatever the changes in political dispensation in Moscow, there would be no wavering in its friendly stance toward India.

On India's fiasco in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1989, Raman terms it Rajiv's folly and not R&AW's. However, he does take many senior officers of security agencies, including R&AW, to task for "egging him on into more and more unwise actions" (p 208). R&AW was outstanding in the 1990s in intercepting communications and naval arms smuggling of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

When the insurgency began in Indian Kashmir in 1987, R&AW jammed Pakistani broadcasts and telecasts and reverse-broadcast Indian propaganda in Pakistani Kashmir. It mobilized anti-Pakistan elements in the Muslim community in India as well as the subcontinental Muslim diaspora in Europe. It strengthened networking with various segments of Pakistan's political class and civil society that were "well disposed towards India" (p 227). R&AW also began building contacts with mujahideen leaders in Afghanistan who were unhappy with the insidious role of the ISI in their country.

After the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts, the first act of mass-casualty terrorism on the ground in India, R&AW pieced together credible evidence of the direct hand of the ISI. Kao remarked at that time in disgust that, in spite of solid proof, "the US will never act against Pakistan for anything it does to India". Raman adds wryly that "this is as valid today as it was in the past" (p 277).

Raman concludes that R&AW is like "the proverbial curate's egg, good in parts" and requiring genuine improvements in crisis prevention, intelligence analysis, and coordination with fellow agencies in India.

A treasure trove of unknown information and incidents that mark a much misunderstood and maligned agency, this book is a frank account of cloak-and-dagger agents who defend Indian interests through deniable acts.

The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane by B Raman. Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, August 2007. ISBN: 0-9796174-3-X. Price: US$27, 294 pages.


--
Regards,
Karthik Iyer

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

history of Islam in india

From: http://www.blogs.ivarta.com/india-usa-blog-column16.htm

Are Hindus Cowards or Is It Failed Islam in India?

By: Dr. Madan L. Goel
8/5/2007 1:04:16 PM
Author's Home Page
Views expressed here are author"s own and not of this website. Full disclaimer is at the bottom.


(Madan L.Goel is Professor of Political Science in Florida. He lectures and writes on topics related to India, Hinduism and international conflict.)
 


Feedback to author

That "Hindus are cowards" is a theme which has been repeated ad nauseam. Mahatma Gandhi wrote: "Hindus are cowards and Muslims are bullies." A large number of Hindus themselves accept this epithet. Nothing could be farther from the truth. History does not bear out the conclusion.

A brief review of Islamic expansion is necessary.

Islam may be dated to 610 AD, when Mohammad began having conversations with Archangel Gabriel. Mohammads message one true God named Allah attracted a number of followers. But the leaders of Mecca rejected his new teaching. Conflict ensued. In 622, Mohammad was forced to flee to Medina, some 240 miles to the North. Mohammad became the leader of Medina and within a few years felt emboldened to raid Meccan caravans. Mecca signed a treaty of friendship and allowed Muslims to enter the city for pilgrimage. This treaty, however, was abrogated two years later. Muhammad captured Mecca in a bold move. He was now an unchallenged leader. By the time Mohammad died in 632 AD at age 62, he had become the supreme figure in all of Arabia.

Muslim conquests did not stop with the death of Mohammad. Within two years, the holy warriors attacked and conquered the two very powerful empires of the period: Byzantium and Persia. It seemed that, armed with faith in Allah, nothing could stop the soldiers of Islam. In 712, Arabs captured a slice of Sindh on the frontiers of India. In 715 they took Spain after decimating North Africa.

In less than 100 years after Mohammad"s death, the Islamic rule stretched from the frontiers of India all the way to Spain. Victories resumed after a hiatus of three centuries. Believers captured Anatolia (Turkey) in 1071, the throne of Delhi in 1201, and Constantinople in 1453. The Ottomans, once established in Constantinople, took over the countries of Eastern Europe including the Balkans. Only in 1683 did the clock turn when the Turks failed in their siege of Vienna and retreated.

Islam"s rapid rise from insignificance to vast international empire had a touch of the miraculous. How could the Muslims have attained all this if God was not on their side? The fabulous military victories demonstrated to the faithful God"s pleasure with their ways and displeasure with the ways of the infidel.

Observation

Islam's conquest of India was incomplete. The South in India never fully fell under Islam. Majority of the Indians continued being Hindu and maintained their culture even though they labored under Islamic weight. Contrast the situation in India with Islamic conquest of Byzantium, Constantinople, Persia, Egypt, North Africa and Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc). Here, the local cultures and indigenous religious groups (Pagans, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians) could not and did not withstand Islamic pressure and they succumbed. Arab imperialism imposed a new language and a new culture. For example, the Berbers of North Africa (the dominant ethnic strain in Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc) have come to believe that they are ethnically Arab, which they are not. Similarly, Africans in northern Sudan identify themselves as Arabs.

The Nobel Laureate V. S. Naipaul (Beyond Belief, 1998) observed that the Arabs were the most successful colonizers in the world. Arabic becomes a sacred language for over a billion people. Bowing towards Mecca five times a day must surely count as an ultimate symbol of Arab cultural imperialism.

The failure of Islam in India was lamented by Altaf Hussein Hali (1834-1914), who otherwise sang the praises of Islam. In his famous poem called Mussadas, which now is a required reading in many Pakistani schools, Hali lamented as follows. I give the lines in both Urdu and English translation (stanza # 113).

Voh Din e Hijazi ka bebaak bera
Nishan jis ka aksay alam me pahuncha
Mazhaam hua koi khatra no jis ka
Na Oman me thithka Na Qulzum (Red Sea) me jijhka
Kiye paar jis ne saton sumundar
Voh duba dahane me Ganga ke akar

That fearless fleet of Hijaz (Bagdad),
Whose mark reached the extreme limits of the world
Which no hesitation could obstruct
Which did not falter in the Gulf of Oman or in the Red Sea
That Hijazi fleet which spanned the seven seas
Lies shattered in the mouth of the Ganges

Allama Sir Mohammad Iqbal (1873-1938) also lamented that Hindus (Kafirs) prospered while the Muslims were backward and poor. In his long poem Shikwa (Complaint), Iqbal penned the following famous lines:

Tujh ko maloom hai leta thaa koi naam tera
Qavat e buzoo e Muslim ne kiya kaam tera
. . .
Qahar to yeh hai ke kafir ko mile Hur-o-qusur
Aur bichaare Muslmaan ko faqt vada i Hur . . .

Allah, do you know that none sang your story
It is the strength of the Muslim that spread your glory . . .

The shameful thing is that Kafirs enjoy Houries in this life
But Poor Muslims have only a promise of Houries in after life

When temples and shrines were being destroyed, Hindus turned within and produced the most lyrical devotional poetry. Mirabai, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, Surdas, Ravidas, Tulsidas, these and many more composed their poems during Muslim ascendancy in India. It is easier to bring down temple walls. How do you bring down the shakti encased in shlokas and bhajans? Who survives after 500 years? Mighty Babar or Guru Nanak?

Hindus should give up the false notion that they succumbed miserably before the Muslim or British colonization. Shivaji defeated a Mughal army in 1660; Europe followed in defeating the Turks in 1683 (on 9/11/1683, mark the date) at Vienna. India was the first country in all of Asia and Africa to throw off the British colonial yoke in 1947. Independence in Afro-Asia followed only after India succeeded.

Today the headlines dominate the threat from monotheistic, closed ideologies, especially radical Islam. Quietly without firing a shot, however, Indian ideas are resurgent in the globe. From 10 to 20 percent of the American populace subscribe to New Thought spiritual philosophies derived largely from Vedanta. The 21st century may well be an Indian century, not because of India's growing economic might, but because of its perennial philosophy. The clock has begun to turn in favor of ideas that first took root in India some 2,500 years ago: Oneness of Godhead, inherent divinity of man, pluralism, religious freedom and non-violence. See the last part of author's article Oneness in Hinduism

This however will not happen automatically or without joining the fight against obscurantism. The strikes against Hindu civilization arise from several quarters: importation of cheap westernization, materialism, sectarian divides, paucity of great leaders, India being targeted for conversions, and inability of Hindus to come together. The brief historical account given here should provide confidence that the challenges facing the Indian civilization can be met.


Dr. Madan L. Goel

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Regards,
Karthik Iyer